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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF REMOVING
BOOKS FROM SCHOOL LIBRARIES
INTRODUCTION
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic
freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us ...
That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of
orthodoxy over the classroom. . . .The classroom is pecu-
liarly the "marketplace of ideas."'
The states, usually through elected local school boards,
enjoy almost exclusive authority over public education within
their jurisdictions. This power encompasses, among other
things, broad control by each school board over curriculum and
student conduct within the local school system. This authority
is not unfettered, however-it cannot infringe on rights pro-
tected by the first amendment,2 which is applicable to the
states via the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.'
Recently, in spite of the sweeping pronouncement of Mr.
Justice Brennan quoted above, school boards in New York,
New York and Strongsville, Ohio ordered the removal of cer-
tain books from the libraries of their public high schools. In
each case, the sole justification for removal was the controver-
sial content of the books. President's Council, District 25 v.
Community School Board No. 251 involved a New York School
Board decision to remove all copies of Down These Mean
Streets by Piri Thomas from junior high school libraries in
District 25. In a similar case a year later, Minarcini v. Strongs-
I Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)(emphasis added).
2 The first amendment reads in part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
The fourteenth amendment reads in part: "No State shall ...deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. The first amendment was made applicable to the states through the
due process clause in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
4 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
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ville City School District, 5 the local board had ordered removal
of Catch 22 by Joseph Heller and Cat's Cradle by Kurt Vonne-
gut, Jr. from the Strongsville Schools Library.
These cases raise the issue to be analyzed here: Is the
removal of a book from a public school library a violation of the
first amendment rights of the students involved under these
circumstances? To date President's Council and Minarcini are
the only judicial interpretations of the problem, and although
the Minarcini Court hinted at a reconcilation of the two hold-
ings, the conclusions reached were diametrically opposed. The
Second Circuit held that no constitutional issue was involved,'
while the Sixth Circuit held that the school board's action
violated the first amendment.'
An analysis of this conflict will entail a discussion of the
general power of school boards and the corresponding constitu-
tional limits on this power. An examination of two constitu-
tional doctrines which have only recently reached an accepted
level of development-"academic freedom" and the "right to
know"-will be helpful. Unfortunately there is "no clear [line
of] judicial precedent[s] by which one could hold the removal
of a library book from general circulation violative of constitu-
tional liberties."8 Thus the conclusion of the forthcoming dis-
cussion, a workable constitutional rule, must be reached
largely by analogy.
Before going on, a word is required about what is not in-
volved here. First, the authority of school boards to set curri-
cula and select library books is conceded.' Second, the rights
in issue are primarily those of public school students to receive
information; the rights of parents, teachers,' 0 and librarians"
541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
President's Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
' Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
' O'Neil, Libraries, Liberties and the First Amendment, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 209,
211 (1973).
1 In Minarcini the court recognized this authority, upholding the School Board's
textbook selection procedure as consistent with procedural due process.
11 For a discussion of the rights of teachers, see Comment, Personality Control and
Academic Freedom, 1975 UTAH L. REv. 234.
1 For a discussion of the rights of librarians, see O'Neil, Libraries, Librarians and
First Amendment Freedoms, 4 HuMAN RIOHTs 295 (1975), [hereinafter cited as O'Neil,
Libraries, Librarians]; O'Neil, supra note 8.
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will be treated peripherally for the sake of analogy. Finally, the
discussion will be limited to public secondary education, al-
though the same basic principles apply at the university level. 2
I. SCHOOL BOARDS AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM
A. Power of the School Board
As indicated above, responsibility for education is cen-
tered in the general police power of each state. Due to the large
number of people involved in the public high school system,
there is a need for a central body to set policy and promulgate
administrative rules to implement this policy. "Most often this
body is a locally elected board of education. The board's func-
tion is to govern school system affairs, ordinarily pursuant to a
legislative enabling statute.""3 The school board enjoys broad
discretion in all matters involving the educational environ-
ment, including structure of curricula, selection of library
books, and maintenance of order on the school premises. This
wide school board authority has been recognized by the United
States Supreme Court:
By and large, public education in our Nation is committed
to the control of state and local authorities. Courts do not and
cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in
the daily operation of the school systems and which do not
directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values."
It is to these basic constitutional values that this discussion
now turns.
B. Academic Freedom
The concept of academic freedom is somewhat nebulous;
because it applies to many subjects it is incapable of exact
definition. "Ultimate inspiration for the system goes back to
the concept of the medieval university as a community of
," Since private education is largely contractual, involving no state action, princi-
ples applicable to public schools have little relevance to private schools. For informa-
tion concerning the public universities, see Wright, The Constitution on the Campus,
22 VAND. L. Rav. 1027 (1969).
11 Note, Students' Constitutional Rights in Public Secondary Education, 14
WASHBURN L.J. 106, 106 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
" Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (footnote ommited).
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scholars dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge. 1' 5 The birth of
the concept in this country centered around freedom of teach-
ers, both within the university and outside. From this limited
area the idea of academic freedom gradually expanded and was
extended to new areas, including freedom of students from
administrative coercion.' 6
Since academic freedom is not mentioned in the Constitu-
tion, one must look to the "penumbras" of several constitu-
tional provisions, particularly the free expression clause of the
first amendment and the due process clause of the fourteenth,
to derive a constitutional right to academic freedom. 17 The ra-
tionale for this constitutional right has been advanced by Pro-
fessor Thomas Emerson:
The basic concepts of freedom of expression embodied in
the First Amendment are readily applicable to many aspects
of academic freedom. . . .Ultimately any system of freedom
of expression depends upon the existence of an educated,
independent, mature citizenry. Consequently realization of
the objectives of the First Amendment requires educational
institutions that produce graduates who are trained in han-
dling ideas, judging facts and argument, thinking indepen-
dently, and generally participating effectively in the market-
place of ideas. Hence the First Amendment could be said to
require the kind of educational institutions that are capable
of producing such results.'8
1. Evolution of the Concept
The foundation for a right to academic freedom was laid
by the Supreme Court in 1923 in Meyer v. Nebraska.'9 A
teacher convicted under the Nebraska "Simian language law,"
which prohibited the teaching of foreign languages below the
ninth grade level,20 attacked the statute as unconstitutional.
The Court held that the statute violated the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, stating that it was arbitrary and
,5 T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 593 (1970).
IS For a discussion of administrative coercion in the context of academic freedom,
see note 36 infra and accompanying text.
,1 T. EMERSON, supra note 15, at 613.
I !d,
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
21 1919 Neb. Laws ch. 249.
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tended impermissibly to "interfere with the calling of modern
language teachers, and with the opportunities of pupils to ac-
quire knowledge. ... 1 Thus, at an early date it became es-
tablished that state legislation concerning public education
was not absolute and could not conflict with the Constitution.
Tvo decades later, in West Virginia State Board of Educa-
tion v. Barnette, 2 the Court held unconstitutional a flag salute
rule promulgated by the state board of education. This time,
however, the first amendment was relied on to preserve aca-
demic freedom. Mr. Justice Jackson said, "We think the action
of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge
transcends constitutional limitations on their power and in-
vades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose
of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all
official control."
The next phase in the evolution of a right to academic
freedom involved cases dealing with loyalty regulations, which
were used to keep public educational systems free of commun-
ists and subversives. In Wieman v. Updegraff,24 faculty mem-
bers of Oklahoma A. & M. College challenged the validity of
the loyalty oath required for state employees. The majority
held that the oath offended due process since it indiscrimina-
tely penalized "innocent" along with "knowing" activity. 25 Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, concurring, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas,
commented on the principles of academic freedom involved:
[Teachers] cannot carry out their noble task if the con-
ditions for the practice of a responsible and critical mind are
denied to them. They must have the freedom of responsible
inquiry, by thought and action, into the meaning of social
and economic ideas, into the checkered history of social and
economic dogma.2 1
In the next loyalty case, Sweezy v. New Hampshire,27 the
theme developed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter was central to the
22 262 U.S. at 401.
' 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Id. at 642.
24 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
21 Id. at 191.
"Id. at 196 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
354 U.S. 234 (1957).
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majority's holding. The case involved the refusal of a college
professor to answer questions by the Attorney General of New
Hampshire, who was conducting an investigation of subversive
activities, concerning the content of his lectures. The Supreme
Court reversed his contempt conviction as an "invasion of peti-
tioner's liberties in the areas of academic freedom and political
expression-areas in which government should be extremely
reticent to tread.""8 The opinion stressed the rights of both
teachers and students to inquire' study and evaluate.21 The
Court concluded that the state interest involved would not
justify infringement of these first amendment rights."
In 1967, the Supreme Court again gave strong support to
academic freedom in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,3" another
loyalty case. The majority declared New York's loyalty pro-
gram unconstitutionally vague, and commented that "[o]ur
Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to
the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special
concern of the First Amendment .. ."I2 Thus, the loyalty
cases are important in two respects. First, they indicate express
recognition of the concept of academic freedom by the Supreme
Court; and second, while all the cases involved teachers, the
Court had no difficulty in extending the rights involved to stu-
dents as well in dicta.
2. Application to the Book Removal Problem
Two recent decisions involving academic freedom are espe-
cially relevant to the book removal issue. The first is Epperson
v. Arkansas,33 a 1968 decision. An Arkansas public high school
teacher sought a declaration that the state "anti-evolution"
29 Id. at 250.
21 "Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teach-
ers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain
new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die." Id.
30 Id. at 251. Whenever fundamental rights such as those rights guaranteed by the
first amendment are infringed upon by state action, such infringement must be justi-
fied by a "compelling state interest" in order to be valid. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 406-09 (1963).
31 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
12 Id. at 603.
- 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
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statute,3 which prohibited the teaching that man evolved from
other species of life, was unconstitutional. Although the Court
held the law invalid as violative of the religion clauses of the
first amendment, the rationale for the decision seemed to be
directed to a right of academic freedom. Mr. Justice Fortas,
writing for the majority, said:
The State's undoubted right to prescribe the curriculum
for its public schools does not carry with it the right to pro-
hibit. . . the teaching of a scientific theory or doctrine where
that prohibition is based upon reasons that violate the First
Amendment. It is much too late to argue that the State may
impose upon the teachers in its schools any conditions that
it chooses, however restrictive they may be of constitutional
guarantees.
The second case, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Com-
munity School District,36 is of special importance to the prob-
lem, since it was the Supreme Court's first and only pronounce-
ment concerning academic freedom of high school students.
Black armbands were worn by students to express opposition
to the Vietnam conflict in violation of a regulation which pro-
hibited the wearing of such armbands while on school premises.
Invalidating the regulation as an unconstitutional abridgment
of the first amendment freedom of expression, Mr. Justice
Fortas, again writing for the majority, recognized the
"comprehensive authority" of school officials to control con-
duct in the schdols.37 But this authority cannot infringe upon
first amendment rights which, "applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment, are available to
teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either stu-
dents or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
31 ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-1627, 80-1628 (1960). This statute was an adaptation of
the famous Tennessee "monkey law," TENN. CODF ANN. § 49-2008 (1974), which was
involved in Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927). The Tennessee Supreme Court
upheld the validity of the statute, but the teacher's conviction under this anti-
evolution law was reversed since the judge set the fine, which was a jury function.
Recently, similar Tennessee statutes have been held invalid as violations of the estab-
lishment clause of the first amendment. Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975);
Steele v. Waters, 527 S.W.2d 72 (Tenn. 1975).
393 U.S. at 107.
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Id. at 507.
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speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."3 Mr. Justice
Fortas went on to describe the academic freedom of students:
In our system, state-operated schools may not be en-
claves of totalitarianism. School officials do not possess abso-
lute authority over their students. Students in school as well
as out of school are "persons" under our Constitution ...
They may not be confined to the expression of those senti-
ments which are officially approved.3"
But, the Court added, "conduct by the student. . . which...
materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder
or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized
by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech."40 Thus,
for school authorities to regulate expression of student opinion,
they must have specific evidence that such regulation is neces-
sary to avoid material and substantial interference with school
discipline." The importance of Tinker lies in the express recog-
nition. by the Supreme Court of student academic freedom, and
its protection by the first amendment from school board inter-
ference.42
II. THE RIGHT TO KNOW
The book removal problem concerns the right of students
"to receive information which they and their teachers desire
11 Id. at 506.
' Id. at 511 (emphasis added).
o Id. at 513.
4, Id. at 511. This "material and substantial interference" test was borrowed by
the Court from Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966), wherein a school
regulation prohibiting the wearing of "freedom buttons" was struck down as an imper-
missible interference with freedom of expression. The court said such a regulation
could be upheld only upon a showing that the prohibited conduct or activity substan-
tially and materially interfered with the discipline necessary to operate the school.
42 From the foregoing academic freedom cases, Professor Charles Alan Wright has
drawn two basic rules which are helpful in resolving the book removal issue. First,
"Expression cannot be prohibited because of disagreement with or dislike for its con-
tents." Wright, supra note 12, at 1043. This rule was followed by the Supreme Court
in Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). The Court, reversing a college president's
decision to deny a local SDS Chapter recognition as a campus organization, declared
that "[t]he College, acting here as the instrumentality of the State, may not restrict
speech or association simply because it finds the views expressed by any group to be
abhorrent." Id. at 187-88. The second rule drawn by Wright is that "[e]xpression can
be prohibited if it takes the form of action that materially and substantially interferes
with the normal activities of the institution or invades the rights of others." Wright,
supra note 12, at 1043.
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them to have." 3 This right of the recipient to receive informa-
tion and ideas has been loosely termed the "right to know" by
Mr. Justice Douglas." This right is consistent with evidence
that the framers of the first amendment meant to include both
ends of the communication process within the amendment's
scope.1
5
The genesis of the right to know occurred in 1943, in
Martin v. City of Struthers," wherein the Supreme Court
struck down a city ordinance prohibiting door-to-door distribu-
tion of handbills." In holding the ordinance to be an invalid
restraint of freedom of speech and press protected by the first
amendment, the Court said:
The right of fredom of speech and press has broad scope.
The authors of the First Amendment knew that novel and
unconventional ideas might disturb the complacent, but they
chose to encourage a freedom which they believed to be essen-
tial if vigorous enlightenment was ever to triumph over sloth-
ful ignorance. This freedom embraces the right to distribute
literature ... and necessarily protects the right to receive
it. 48
In the 20 years following the decision in Martin, the Court
expanded the theme of the right to know to various contexts,49
and in 1965 decided Lamont v. Postmaster General,5" which
involved the validity of a federal statute that required postal
officials to detain and destroy unsealed mail determined to be
communist political propaganda from foreign countries unless
11 Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1976).
4, 409 U.S. 998, 999 (1972), denying cert. to President's Council, Dist. 25 v. Com-
munity School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
4 James Madison, who was instrumental in drafting the first amendment, once
wrote that "[k]nowledge will forever govern ignorance; and a people who mean to be
their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives. A
popular government without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but
a prologue to a farce or tragedy, or perhaps both." Letter from James Madison to W.T.
Barry (Aug. 4, 1882), reprinted in 9 WmTINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (G. Hunt ed.
1910).
319 U.S. 141 (1943).
' Id. at 142.
Id. at 143.
" Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception advice); Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (handbill distribution in company town); Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (public speech to enlist membership in labor union).
- 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
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the addressee returned a reply card requesting receipt of the
mail in question." The majority held the statute unconstitu-
tional because it required "an. official act (viz., returning the
reply card) [which functioned] as a limitation on the unfet-
tered exercise of the addressees' First Amendment rights."5 In
a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Mr. Jus-
tice Goldberg, further developed the underlying constitutional
issues: "I think the right to receive publications is. . . a funda-
mental right. The dissemination of ideas can accomplish noth-
ing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and
consider them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that
had only sellers and no buyers."-3
The right to know also surfaced in the broadcasting field,
in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.54 Broadcasters attacked
the fairness doctrine and its component "personal attack" rules
promulgated by the FCC,55 as infringing upon the rights of free
speech and press guaranteed by the first amendment. The
Court, per Mr. Justice White, upheld the regulations as en-
hancing the first amendment freedoms of listeners and
viewers:
It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ulti-
mately prevail .... It is the right to receive suitable access
to social, political, esthetic, moral; and other experiences
which is crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be
abridged .... 11
In Kleindienst v. Mandel, 7 university professors sought to
compel the Attorney General to grant a visa to Ernest Mandel,
a Belgian Marxist journalist and theoretician, to enable him to
participate in conferences to which he had been invited by a
number of American universities. The Court upheld denial of
the visa, citing the plenary congressional power to exclude
11 Postal Service and Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962, § 305(a), 39 U.S.C.
§ 4008(a) (1962).
52 381 U.S. at 305.
Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring).
- 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123, 73.300, 73.598, 73.679 (1976). These regulations derive their
authority from the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)
(1970).
395 U.S. at 390.
57 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
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aliens. But the Court did admit by way of dictum that "[i]n
a variety of circumstances this Court has referred to a First
Amendment right to 'receive information and ideas' ....
[T]his right is 'nowhere more vital' than in our schools and
universities."
58
In 1974, the Court decided Procunier v. Martinez," a case
from which one can draw a clear analogy to the book removal
issue. There the question involved the constitutionality of pris-
oner mail censorship regulations of the California Department
of Corrections. The Supreme Court held the regulations invalid
since they allowed prison officials to "apply their own personal
prejudices and opinions as to standards for prisoner mail cen-
sorship. . . ."' The Court again expressly relied upon the
right to know:
[M]ail censorship implicates more than the rights of prison-
ers.
... Both parties to the correspondence have an interest
... and censorship of the communication between them
necessarily impinges on the interest of each. . . . [T]he ad-
dressee as well as the sender of direct personal correspond-
ence derives from the First and Fourteenth Amendments a
protection against unjustified governmental interference with
the intended communication."
Thus, the regulations were invalid for failure to further a com-
pelling state interest unrelated to the suppression of expres-
sion. 2
The most recent Supreme Court opinion concerning the
right to know, one which was crucial to the Sixth Circuit deci-
sion in Minarcini, is Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 3 The Court overturned
a Virginia statute which had classified the practice by licensed
pharmacists of advertising the price of prescription drugs as
unprofessional conduct. 4 At issue was "whether a State may
" Id. at 762-63.
416 U.S. 396 (1974).
' Id. at 415.
Id. at 408-09.
" See note 30 tupra for an explanation of the compelling state interest require-
ment.
- 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
" VA. CoD § 54-524.35(3) (1974).
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completely suppresss the dissemination of concededly truthful
information about entirely lawful activity, [being] fearful of
that information's effect upon its disseminators and its recipi-
ents."65 Mr. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, de-
clared that freedom of speech protected the recipient of a com-
munication as well as the source, and concluded that the state
could not suppress this information.
From the foregoing analysis, one can assume that there is
a well-defined right to know. In the words of Mr. Justice Mar-
shall, "It is now well established that the Constitution protects
the right to receive information and ideas. . . .This right to
receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth
. . . is fundamental to- our free society." 6 The next task in-
volves application of this right to know, as well as the concept
of academic freedom, to the removal of books from a public
school library.
III. DIFFERING POSITIONS ON THE BOOK REMOVAL ISSUE
To fully understand the issue involved, a discussion of the
facts and reasoning behind the two conflicting opinions is nec-
essary. This will allow analysis of the comparative strengths
and weaknesses of the positions taken by the Second and Sixth
Circuits, which will serve as guidelines for the ultimate goal of
formulating a constitutional rule.
A. President's Council, District 25 v. Community School
Board No. 2567
In 1971, Community School Board Number 25 voted (five
to three) to remove all copies of Down These Mean Streets from
junior high libraries in the district." This resolution was modi-
fied by a resolution to keep the book on the shelves, but only
for direct loan to parents of students. 9 The book is an autobio-
graphical account of a Puerto Rican youth growing up in Span-
ish Harlem, containing obscenities and descriptions of sex,
425 U.S. at 773.
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
" 457 F.2d at 290.
9 Id.
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violence, and drug encounters. 0 Apparently the School Board
thought it would have an "adverse moral and psychological
effect"7 on the students. The resolution resulted in a class
action (brought by parents, students, teachers, a librarian, and
a principal) under the Civil Rights Act 72 seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief. The District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York dismissed the complaint without opinion.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, de-
nying that any first amendment issue was involved:
Since we are dealing not with the collection of a public book
store but with the library of a public junior high school, evi-
dently some authorized person or body has to make a deter-
mination as to what the library collection will be. It is pre-
dictable that no matter what choice of books may be made
by whatever segment of academe, some other person or group
may well dissent. The ensuing shouts of book burning, witch
hunting and violation of academic freedom hardly elevate
this intramural strife to first amendment constitutional pro-
portions.
73
The court, per Judge Mulligan, went on to distinguish the
case at bar from several academic freedom cases cited by the
petitioners. President's Council was different from Epperson
because no religious issue was involved and because there was
no ban on the teaching of any theory or doctrine: "The prob-
lems of the youth in the ghetto, crime, drugs and violence have
not been placed off limits by the Board. ' 74 Judge Mulligan
explained that teachers remained free to discuss the book in
class and that students could read the book if their parents saw
fit to check it out for them. Thus, the court concluded that
infringement of first amendment rights was only "miniscule."
7 5
Distinguishing Tinker, the Second Circuit again maintained
that no problems involving freedom of speech or expression
existed since classroom discussion of Down These Mean Streets
was not banned. Finally, Judge Mulligan disposed of Keefe v.
"1 Id. at 291.
71 Id.
72 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
r 457 F.2d at 291-92.
7, Id. at 292.
75 Id.
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Geanakos7" and Parducci v. Rutland,77 in which teachers were
discharged" for assigning material which school officials con-
sidered objectionable. In both cases the dismissals were invali-
dated due to infringement of academic freedom protected by
the first amendment. The Second Circuit differentiated the
case at bar on the basis that no teachers were discharged.
The rationale of President's Council is contained in a
sweeping statement which the Sixth Circuit in Minarcini v.
Strongsville City School District" would later refuse to follow:
The administration of any library, whether it be a uni-
versity or particularly a public junior high school, involves a
constant process of selection and winnowing based not only
on educational needs but financial and architectural reali-
ties. To suggest that the shelving or unshelving of books pres-
ents a constitutional issue, particularly where there is no
showing of a curtailment of freedom of speech or thought, is
a proposition we cannot accept."
B.' Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Board"
This case, brought by five public high school students
(through parents as next friends), involved a first amendment
claim under the Civil Rights Act similar to the claim in
President's Council. The Strongsville Board of Education
passed resolutions to remove Catch 22 and Cat's Cradle from
the district's school library.2 The sole explanation for the
School Board's action is contained in the minutes of a Board
meeting: God Bless You Mr. Rosewater was described as
"completely sick" and "garbage" and it was recommended
that "Cat's Cradle, which was written by the same character
(Vennegutter) [sic] who wrote, using the term loosely, God
Bless you Mr. Rosewater. . .be withdrawn immediately and
7' 418 F.2d 359 (lst Cir. 1969).
" 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
7 See generally Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Pickering v. Board of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Adams v. Campbell County School Dist., 511 F.2d 1242
(10th Cir. 1975); Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1973); Wilson v. Chancellor,
418 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Ore. 1976). For further discussion on teacher discharge cases,
see Comment, Personality Control and Academic Freedom, 1975 UTAH L. REv. 234.
7' 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
457 F.2d at 293.
" 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 581.
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all copies disposed of . ... "83 The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit reversed the district court 4 which had upheld the
removal of the books.
The Court of Appeals objected to the reliance by the dis-
trict court upon President's Council:
The District Judge in our instant case appears to have
read this paragraph as upholding an absolute right on the
part of this school board to remove from the library and pre-
sumably to destroy any books it regarded unfavorably with-
out concern for the First Amendment. We do not read the
Second Circuit opinion so broadly [the court referred to the
qualification in the President's Council holding which lim-
ited the power of removal to situations wherein there is no
curtailment Qf freedom of speech or thought]. If it were un-
qualified, we would not follow it.8
Judge Edwards then proceeded to explain that public
school libraries are a privilege created by the state for the bene-
fit of the students, a privilege "not subject to being withdrawn
by succeeding school boards whose members might desire to
'winnow' the library for books. the content of which occasioned
their displeasure or disapproval.""8 The court was not satisfied
by the argument that the removal was valid since the books
were not banned from classroom discussion and were available
from other sources, for the public school library is "a valuable
adjunct to classroom discussion." 7 With the books banned
from the library, the students' academic freedom would be
hindered. "The removal of books from a school library is a
much more serious burden upon freedom of classroom discus-
sion than the action found unconstitutional in Tinker .... ",88
Finally, the court found that, although book removal is a more
difficult constitutional problem than a direct restraint on
speech, the right of a student to receive information under the
protection of the first amendment was well established by the
right to know cases.8 The court then held:
Id. at 581-82.
, 384 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
541 F.2d at 581.
"Id.
' Id. at 582.
"Id.
" Id. at 583. The court relied particularly on Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy,
Procunier, and Kleindienst. The right to know cases are discussed in Part I supra.
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In the absence of any explanation of the Board's action
which is neutral in First Amendment terms, we must con-
clude that the School Board removed the books because it
found them objectionable in content and because it felt that
it had the power, unfettered by the First Amendment, to
censor the school library for subject matter which the Board
members found distasteful."
C. The Correct Approach
As mentioned above, the Second Circuit in President's
Council attempted to distinguish the academic freedom cases,
Epperson and Tinker, on the grounds that classroom discussion
and outside reading of Down These Mean Streets were not
prohibited, and there was therefore no first amendment in-
fringement. This reasoning is flawed for a variety of reasons.
First, the basic flaw was the court's failure to differentiate the
decision to place a book in the library from the decision to
remove it. The budget and the amount of shelf space available
must be taken into account when a decision is made on whether
to purchase a book. Financial and space considerations will
prevent some books from being purchased. But this is quite a
different situation from removing a book already purchased
and placed in the library because some school board members
feel the content of the book is objectionable. Yet the broad
language9' used by the court in President's Council fails to
distinguish adequately the removal decision from the decision
not to purchase. Second, as the Minarcini opinion pointed out,
simple removal of books from the library would hinder the
academic freedom of students by forcing them to seek an alter-
native source. In addition, a banned book would be accessible
only to those students having the financial ability to purchase
the book. Third, as Mr. Justice Douglas points out, the theory
that the students can do anything but read the book "lessens
somewhat the contention that the subject matter of the book
is not proper. 9 2 Finally, the Supreme Court has already made
" 541 F.2d at 582.
, See note 80 and accompanying text supra for the broad language used by the
Minarcini court. See also O'Neil, supra note 8, at 211.
2 409 U.S. 998, 999 (1972), denying cert. to President's Council, Dist. 25 v. Com-
munity School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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clear its stance on the validity of an alternate access theory:
"[W]e are loath to hold . . . that existence of other alterna-
tives extinguishes altogether any constitutional interest on the
part of the appellees in this particular form of access.
'93
President's Council described the infringement of first
amendment rights as "miniscule," but
[t]he restraint is not small when it is considered what was
restrained. . . If the restraint were smaller than it is, it is
from petty tyrannies that large ones take root and grow ...
Seedlings planted in that soil grow great and, growing, break
down the foundations of liberty. 4
Although the Second Circuit did not have before it any of
the aforementioned right to know cases, the inescapable logic
of Procunier v. Martinez95 negates the rationale of the
President's Council holding. It cannot be argued seriously that
the governmental interest in control and censorship is stronger
in the public schools than in the prison system.
As Mr. Justice Douglas explained:
The First Amendment is a preferred right and is of great
importance in the schools. . . . Are we sending children to
school to be educated by the norms of the School Board or
are we educating our youth to shed the prejudices of the past,
to explore all forms of thought, and to find solutions to our
world's problems?6
Of course, the rational answer is the latter alternative, the one
chosen by the Sixth Circuit. All that remains is the definition
of a constitutional rule based on Minarcini.
IV. A WORKABLE STANDARD
A. The Rule
Applying both the foregoing discussions concerning aca-
demic freedom and the right to know and the rationale of
Minarcini, one can construct a constitutional rule which should
" Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972). See also Schneider v. New
Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
" Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 543 (1945).
' 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
" 409 U.S. 998, 999-1000 (1972), denying cert. to President's Council, Dist. 25 v.
Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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resolve future questions concerning the validity of book re-
moval. The rule is stated as follows: In the absence of an ex-
planation neutral in first amendment terms, removal of a book
from a public high school library by a school board will be held
violative of the freedoms guaranteed to the students involved
by the first and fourteenth amendments, namely academic
freedom and the right to know. Examples of permissible re-
moval "neutral in first amendment terms" are obscenity, con-
duct control, and practical physical limitations. Of course,
removal for any of these reasons must satisfy procedural due
process.
1. Obscenity
The Supreme Court made its landmark decision concern-
ing obscenity in 1957, in Roth v. United States.97 There the
Court held that "obscenity is not within the area of constitu-
tionally protected speech or press."" This statement is, in the
words of one scholar, "the cornerstone of American obscenity
law."99 Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, enunci-
ated the standard as "whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of
the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."'00
In 1973 the Burger Court redefined the standard in Miller v.
California. 01 The new test had three prongs:
(a) [W]hether "the average person, applying contempo-
rary community standards" would find that the work, taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest... ; (b) whether
the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value.102
Thus, since obscenity is not protected by the first amendment,
a school board may constitutionally remove an obscene book
from a public high school library. However, the procedure em-
97 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
" Id. at 485.
F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENrrY 39 (1976).
354 U.S. at 489.
101 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
"o2 Id. at 24.
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ployed must be consistent with the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment-it cannot be arbitrary and capricious.
Since the line separating material protected by the first
amendment from material that is obscene is imprecise, "the
courts have imposed the idea of the adversary hearing over all
of obscenity law to insure that no actual suppression of speech
occurs until after it has been determined that the speech to be
suppressed is in fact not protected by the First Amendment.
' 10 3
It follows that before a school can ban a book as obscene, the
students are entitled to a hearing in which the school board
must satisfy the trier that the book in question fits into the
tripartite test of Miller v. California.'o4
2. Conduct Control
The Supreme Court announced in Tinker that student
conduct which materially disrupts classwork or substantially
interferes with school discipline or the rights of others is not
immunized by the first amendment. In this context, severe
psychological harm to students caused by a book would fall
under interference with the rights of others. Administration of
the Tinker test is difficult, but cases dealing with prior re-
straint of student publications can be examined for guidance." 5
In Shanley v. Northeast Independent School District,'0" the
Fifth Circuit declared:
[E]xpression by high school students can be prohibited alto-
gether if it materially or substantailly interferes with school
activities or with the rights of other students or teachers or if
the school administration can demonstrate reasonable cause
to believe that the expression would engender such material
and substantial interference. . . . It is not necessary that the
school administration stay a reasonable exercise of restraint
"until disruption actually occur[s]."' 17
a SCHAUER, supra note 99, at 206.
'0 For further information on obscenity, see Annot., 41 L.Ed.2d 1257 (1975);
Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 1158 (1966); Fahringer & Brown, The Rise and Fall of Roth-A
Critique of the Recent Supreme Court Obscenity Decisions, 62 Ky. L.J. 731 (1974).
lu For a discussion of prior restraints on student publications, see Annot., 16
A.L.R.Fed. 182 (1973); Note, Prior Restraints in Public High Schools, 82 YALE L.J.
1325 (1973).
IN 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972).
'' Id. at 970.
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Hence, another permissible rationale for book- removal is
"material and substantial interference" of school activities
caused by the book. Shanley explains that this standard in-
cludes both disruption in fact or a reasonable forecast of such
disruption. In either case, the school authorities must provide
concrete facts supporting their decision.
Once again, the process of removal must satisfy procedural
due process. The burden of proof is on the state, through the
school board,1 8 to show that the removal of a book for conduct
control was not arbitrary and capricious. This would include
demonstrable evidence of disruption in fact or a reasonable
forecast thereof. A factor that may weigh heavily is consistency
of regulation. In Tinker, it was significant that all symbols of
controversial nature (political campaign buttons, Iron Crosses)
were not banned.0 9 And in Vought v. Van Buren Public
Schools,"10 the dismissal of a student for possession of a book
containing four-letter words was struck down as denial of due
process since the same words were also contained in several
books in the school library. The district court said, "We decline
to become involved here in a discussion of obscenity. . . . We
profess no expertise whatsoever in this field, but we do recog-
nize rank inconsistency when we see it. And we see it here. And
the inconsistency is so inherently unfair as to be arbitrary and
unreasonable. .... "I
3. Practical Exceptions
As the Sixth Circuit recognized in Minarcini, books may
be removed for reasons concerning the physical condition of the
particular books or library involved. These practical exceptions
would include worn or defaced books, obsolete books, and re-
moval of books due to simple lack of shelf space. As long as the
removal is based in good faith upon one of these physical limi-
tations, and not merely upon the controversial nature of the
" Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969); Shanley v. Northeast Independent School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972);
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
10 393 U.S. at 510.
110 306 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
"I Id. at 1396.
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author or content of the removed book, there is no first amend-
ment infringement.
1 1 2
4. Age and Maturity
Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring in Tinker, took the posi-
tion that the rights of children under the first amendment are
not as strong as those of adults.13 This has led several commen-
tators' 4 and one court to conclude: "Free speech under the
First Amendment, though available to juveniles and high
school students, as well as adults, is not absolute and the ex-
tent of its application may properly take into consideration the
age or maturity of those to whom it is addressed."' 15 Does it
follow that the above-mentioned rule must be tempered by
evaluation of the age and maturity of the students affected?
Although the issue is not settled, analysis of a 1968 Supreme
Court decision leads to the conclusion that this factor is of
questionable relevance.
In Ginsberg v. New York, "I a bookseller was convicted
under a New York statute prohibiting sale to minors of mate-
rial defined to be obscene on the basis of its appeal to them."'
The bookseller violated the statute by sale of two "girlie" mag-
azines to a minor (the magazines were not obscene by adult
"I An additional but peripheral exception is incitement. The concept surfaced in
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). The Court said that the first amendment
will not prevail where spoken or printed words are "used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Id. at 52. The modern
version of the clear and present danger test was announced in Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969):
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit
a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.
Id. at 447. Thus, a book directed to and likely to incite imminent illegal activity could
be removed without constitutional infringement. However, the importance of the ex-
ception is only minimal since this activity would also fit into the material disruption
test.
"I Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515
(1969) (Stewart, J., concurring).
"I Wright, supra note 12, at 1052-53; Developments in the Law-Academic
Freedom, 81 HARv. L. Rxv. 1045, 1053 (1968).
"I Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 57 (4th Cir. 1971).
"' 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
"' N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h (McKinney 1909).
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standards). In upholding the statute against the bookseller's
first amendment claim, Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the
plurality, explained that the statute "simply adjusts the defini-
tion of obscenity 'to social realities by permitting the appeal of
this type of material to be assessed in terms of the sexual inter-
ests . . .' of such minors.""' Thus, the "average person" com-
ponent was made variable to read "average minor." While on
the surface Ginsberg seems to require some assessment of age
in the book removal question, two limiting factors tend to re-
fute this position. First, it is important to understand that
while Ginsberg allows a variable "average person" standard, it
"still requires a finding of obscenity.""' The second factor
pointing toward a single standard for adults and minors is the
questionable validity of the Ginsberg opinion in light of Miller.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger, author of the Miller decision, stated
therein: "Nor does [Mr. Justice Brennan] indicate where in
the Constitution he finds the authority to distinguish between
a willing 'adult' 1 month past the state law age of majority and
a willing 'juvenile' 1 month younger.'' ° These factors tend to
diminish the need to include an age or maturitystandard in the
book removal decision.
2'
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing analysis the following conclusions may
be drawn. Local school boards have wide discretion in formula-
tion of policy and regulations involving the public high school
system within their districts. This broad power includes control
over curriculum, school system libraries, and student conduct.
This authority is not unfettered, however; it is tempered by the
concepts of academic freedom (freedom of students from ad-
ministrative coercion) and the right to know (the right of stu-
dents to receive information). These concepts have been devel-
oped by the Supreme Court as rights implicitly guaranteed by
"' 390 U.S. at 638.
"' SCHAUER, supra note 99, at 89.
1 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27 (1973).
22 This position is supported by the Seventh Circuit in Scoville v. Bd. of Educ.,
425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970), which concerned expulsion of students for distributing
material critical of school officials: "We think the district court should not have been
concerned over the immaturity of the student readers." Id. at 13 n.5.
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the first and fourteenth amendments. As one scholar com-
mented, "the risks of repression and censorship-the stifling of
a major artery of free inquiry and public debate-cannot be
minimized simply because adequate precedent is lacking. ' ' 22
Win. Kennedy Simpson
In O'Neil,.Libraries, Librarians, supra note 11, at 311-12.
